


































Payout policy and ownership structure: The Case of Islamic and
Conventional Banks






Cyswllt i'r cyhoeddiad / Link to publication
Dyfyniad o'r fersiwn a gyhoeddwyd / Citation for published version (APA):
Duqi, A., Jaafar, A., & Warsame, M. H. (2020). Payout policy and ownership structure: The Case
of Islamic and Conventional Banks. British Accounting Review, 52(1).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2019.03.001
Hawliau Cyffredinol / General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or
other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal
requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private
study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
 11. May. 2021
1 
 
Payout policy and ownership structure: The case of Islamic and 
conventional banks 
Andi Duqi* 
Department of Management, University of Bologna 
 
Aziz Jaafar 
Bangor Business School, Bangor University 
  
Mohammed Warsame 
College of Business Administration, University of Sharjah 
 
Abstract 
Using a sample of Islamic and conventional financial institutions domiciled in 16 countries 
for the period 2000-2015, we examine how ownership structure affects dividend policy. Our 
main findings indicate that ownership identity is important in explaining dividend policy in 
these banks, albeit in different patterns. In particular, the results suggest that government 
ownership seems to exert negative effects on dividend payouts in both types of banks, which 
is in line with the preference of governments towards bank stability. With respect to family 
ownership, the impact is negative for conventional banks but positive for Islamic ones, 
consistent with agency theory. These results are to some extent similar in the case of foreign 
ownership where it is associated with a higher payout policy in Islamic banks, but not 
significant in conventional ones. Our results are robust to an array of additional analyses 
including propensity score matching. 
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Islamic financial institutions have witnessed a rapid growth in the last decades and they 
have been very resilient and competitive vis-a-vis conventional institutions in many 
jurisdictions particularly in the Asian and Middle East regions (International Monetary Fund, 
2015, Doumpos, Hasan, & Pasiouras, 2017). 1 Their modus operandi has attracted considerable 
interest from both academics and policy makers, and within this context, there has been a 
growing number of prior works that examine differences between Islamic and conventional 
banks (e.g. Abdelsalam, Dimitropoulos, Elnahass & Leventis, 2016; Athari, Adaoglu, & 
Bektas, 2016). This paper aims to extend this strand of research by analyzing the payout policy 
of these institutions. In particular, we empirically investigate the role of ownership structure in 
shaping their payout policy, which is largely an overlooked topic in the banking literature in 
comparison to the evidence on non-financial firms.  
Prior literature argues that dividends alleviate agency problems arising between managers 
(controlling shareholders) and owners (minority shareholders) when ownership is dispersed 
(concentrated) (Jensen, 1986; De Cesari, 2012; Lepetit, Meslier & Wardhana, 2017). By 
distributing dividends, firms curb the potential extraction of resources by insiders, and hence 
signal to the market their commitment to limit expropriation (Chu, Haw, Lee & Wu, 2014). 
Other studies have pointed out that the payout preferences of different types of largest 
shareholders (e.g., government, financial institutions or families) are not homogeneous 
(Jagannathan, Stephens & Weisbach, 2000; Short, Zhang & Keasey, 2002). For instance, Ben-
Nasr (2015) shows that dividend payout ratios are negatively affected by government 
ownership because of higher agency costs in state owned firms. Allen, Bernardo and Welch 
                                                          
1Islamic banking and finance is based on Shariah guidelines which prohibit the payment of interest. Other features include 
prohibition to invest in particular derivative assets, or in activities that generate revenues from the sale of drugs, alcohol, 




(2000) and Jeon, Lee and Moffett (2011) report that foreign institutional investors generally 
demand higher dividend payouts since this could be a disciplinary device that reduces the 
expropriation of resources by managers (Easterbrook, 1984; Farre-Mensa et al., 2014). Family 
ownership is generally linked to lower dividends because this shareholder tends to extract rents 
from minority owners, use firm resources to provide unjustified benefits to members of the 
family or invest in negative cash flow projects (Gonzalés, Guzmán, Pombo & Trujillo, 2014; 
Al Najjar & Kilincarslan, 2016).  
Thus far, little academic work exists with respect to investigating the effects of shareholders 
on bank payouts, and extant literature mainly focuses on US banks with dispersed ownership. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that dividends can be used by managers to disclose bank quality 
(Abreu & Gulamhussen, 2013; Floyd & Skinner, 2015). Banks generally display a higher 
degree of opaqueness, and hence agency costs are more severe. Consequently, the signaling 
role of dividends in banking institutions seems to be more important than for other industries, 
especially during a financial crisis period (Forti & Schiozer, 2015). In another context, Onali, 
Galiakhmetova, Molyneux and Torluccio (2016) investigate the payout policy of European 
banks and find that the effects of government ownership can be ambiguous. Government 
ownership results in a high payout level in order to maximize the value of its investment 
(Gugler, 2003). However, since generous dividend payouts might erode bank capital, the 
government has an incentive to monitor bank dividends and urge their reduction if necessary 
(Onali et al., 2016). In a similar setting, Lepetit et al. (2017) report that family-owned banks in 
Europe pay lower dividends suggesting that this type of owner is more prone to divert bank 
resources and expropriate minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, there are at least two additional factors that could differently influence the 
payout policy of Islamic banks vis-à-vis their conventional counterparts, which have not been 
addressed by prior research. First, in addition to Shariah supervisory board and religiosity 
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monitoring, Islamic banks face a different type of agency costs which is not present in 
conventional banks (Abdelsalam et al., 2016).2 That is, given that Islamic banks do not permit 
for the charging of fixed interest, these institutions have developed alternative products based 
on  the principle of sharing profits and losses (Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt & Merrouche, 2013; 
Abedifar, Molyneux & Tarazi, 2013). These so-called profit sharing investment accounts 
(PSIA) are similar to equity capital to the extent that the bank is entitled to pool them together 
with shareholder’s capital and invest in loans or other assets. Profits deriving from these 
investments are then divided between the PSIA holder and the bank on the basis of a 
predetermined ratio (Archer & Karim, 2010).  Unlike depositors in conventional banks, PSIA 
holders could theoretically support even losses arising from these investments. However, they 
are not granted the same shareholder rights, as long as the governance of Islamic banks does 
not allow for effective monitoring of the management by PSIA holders. Under such opaque 
legal framework, expropriation of PSIA holders can occur in several ways. Boards which are 
aligned with large shareholders could grant the latter high dividends by manipulating the rate 
of return of PSIA holders. They could also invest PSIA funds in non-remunerative projects, 
whereas shareholder funds be invested in high net present value ones. Thus, dividend policy 
could be used as an expropriation tool, insofar it allows shareholders to divert funds from 
investment account holders, in an opposite pattern compared to conventional banks. Second, 
Islamic banks adopt a more prudent capital structure as they have limited financing choices 
compared to conventional competitors. Moreover, Islamic money markets are generally 
underdeveloped (Abedifar et al., 2013). This precludes somehow their engagement in asset 
liability management. Hence, these institutions could be more conservative in setting their 
payout policy in order to build capital buffers. Beck et al. (2013) report that Islamic financial 
                                                          
2 The Shariah board consists of learned Islamic scholars specialised in Islamic jurisprudence. The board main responsibilities 
include: (i) overseeing banks’ activities to ensure that they operate in a Shariah compliant manner; (ii) assisting in the 
structuring, as well as providing Shariah approvals for new products and services; (iii) certifying in the financial report on 
whether the bank has been operating in a Shariah compliant manner and (iv) reporting any violation of Shariah principles. 
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institutions display better capitalization ratios compared to conventional ones in line with these 
assumptions.  
Employing a dataset of both Islamic and conventional financial institutions domiciled in 16 
jurisdictions for the period 2000-2015, our main findings indicate that ownership identity is 
indeed important for explaining dividend policy in these banks, albeit in different patterns. In 
particular, government ownership seems to exert a negative effect on dividend payouts in both 
types of financial institutions, which is consistent with the preference of governments towards 
bank stability. In the case of family ownership, the impact is negative for conventional banks 
but positive for Islamic ones, consistent with agency theory. It seems that family owned Islamic 
banks tend to expropriate PSIA holders by paying higher dividends to their shareholders, 
whereas expropriation (of minority shareholders) in conventional ones occurs by reducing 
dividends. These results are corroborated by the impact of foreign ownership, i.e., it is 
associated with a more generous payout policy in Islamic banks, but not significant in 
conventional ones. When controlling for bank size, our results show that the abovementioned 
outcomes are driven by the largest conventional and Islamic banks which the previous literature 
has established as being more risky than smaller institutions. 
Our study incrementally contributes to the extant banking and finance literature in three 
ways: First, it enhances our understanding on the dividend policy in financial institutions by 
highlighting the importance of owners’ identity and their different objectives with respect to 
payouts in banks. This is still an under-researched area in financial firms as compared to the 
literature on non-financial ones. Second, this is one of the first empirical works that attempts 
to explore the dividend payout policy in Islamic and conventional financial institutions, and to 
address the different agency costs that arise in the former which are not present in conventional 
banks or in non-financial firms. As far as we know, the study by Athari et al. (2016) is the only 
cross-country analysis of dividend policy in Islamic vs. conventional institutions, but they 
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focus predominantly on the association between country legal origin or investor protection and 
the payout policy in the Arab countries, without considering the importance of ownership 
structure. Third, from an empirical perspective, we employ a dynamic panel estimation which 
yields much more robust results in the presence of dividend persistence. The extant literature 
on bank payouts generally does not account for this factor which is surprising, given the well-
known practice of dividend smoothing over time by managers.3  
The study proceeds as follows: we review the extant studies on dividend policy, differences 
in the banking model of Islamic vis-à-vis conventional banks, and outline our research 
hypotheses in section 2. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics of our sample, methodology 
and variables. Section 4 discusses the empirical analysis, and Section 5 reports a number of 
robustness tests. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature and Development of Hypotheses  
2.1 Dividend policy of Islamic vs. conventional banks  
Unlike the conventional banking model of accepting deposits and handing out loans on an 
interest basis (Ali & Sarkar, 1995), Islamic banks employ alternative partnership loans (fund 
mobilization) schemes which are based on a profit and loss sharing scheme between the bank 
and the entrepreneur (the bank and the capital provider). In particular, on the bank liability side, 
most of the depositors are considered as quasi-equity holders of investment accounts whose 
returns are linked to the Islamic banks’ profit level (PSIA holders). This implies that profits 
                                                          
3 As far as we know, only Onali (2014) and to a limited extent Athari et al. (2015) employ a GMM specification in their 
papers on bank dividend payouts. 
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generated from Islamic bank assets are divided between the bank and the PSIA holders at pre-
specified rates.  
The use of investment accounts, which provides 62% of the source of funding 
(Sundararajan, 2007), creates a complicated agency issue in Islamic banks. In particular, the 
bank acts not only as an agent on behalf of the bank shareholders, but also on behalf of the 
PSIA holders. This could lead to potential conflicts of interests when the goals of both parties 
are not aligned (Archer, Karim & Al-Deehani, 1998). With respect to concentrated ownership, 
majority shareholders are able to monitor bank management but this is not the case for PSIA 
holders. The governance mechanism of Islamic banks does not provide PSIA holders any 
capacity to monitor the management. Hence, PSIA holders could be considered similar to 
minority shareholders in conventional banks insofar they are at risk of being expropriated by 
large blockholders. However, whilst minority shareholders would benefit from larger dividends 
to mitigate agency issues, PSIA holders face the opposite problem. As documented by Archer 
and Karim (2013), they would be adversely affected if the bank increases dividends to placate 
large owners, without simultaneously offering an equivalent rate of return to PSIA holders.4  
Anecdotal evidence shows that dividend policy can be adjusted to accommodate the 
interests of PSIA holders (Archer, Karim & Sundararajan, 2010). In particular, shareholders 
voluntarily agree to forgo part of the profits that belongs to the bank (and indirectly to them) 
to ensure that the return of PSIA holders is competitive. This is to avoid a bank run or huge 
fund withdrawals that could jeopardize the stability of the bank (IFSB, 2010). In a certain way, 
this practice supports a sort of ‘vicarious monitoring’, to the extent that PSIA holders implicitly 
expect their returns to be ‘adequate’ to those of the competitors, and rely on shareholders who 
                                                          
4 On the contrary, Abdelsalam et al. (2016) argue that PSIA holders should be adequately protected given that managers of 
Islamic banks are supposed to adhere to strict ethical norms.  Furthermore, the presence of Shariah boards should mitigate the 
managerial opportunistic behaviour, and thus moderate agency costs. However, they focus on earnings management and 
financial reporting, and do not investigate banks’ dividend policy, which is usually adopted to divert firm cash flows from 
PSIA holders to controlling owners. 
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sacrifice part of their profits to encourage that PSIA holders remain with the bank. However, 
Archer and Karim (2013) report that this practice (which adversely affected the shareholders) 
has been replaced by the widely used smoothing techniques including profit equalization 
reserves (PER) and investment risk reserves (IRR). Moreover, Islamic banks provide limited 
disclosure on the criteria they use to allocate profits between different stakeholders, and the 
use of these reserves. 5 The scope of PER or IRR is to improve payouts to account holders in 
bad times, but given that PSIA holders have no say on how these funds are being used, the 
reserves could be diverted to dividend payouts to shareholders if decided by the board (Archer 
& Karim, 2009; Nienhaus, 2007). These problems are exacerbated when Islamic banks are 
operating in an environment where investor protection is weak and ownership structure is 
highly concentrated which is the norm in most of the countries in which these banks are 
domiciled. Furthermore, due to the high degree of opacity and lack of monitoring, the PSIA 
holders may not be aware if IRR is used to absorb losses arising from managerial misconduct. 
Consequently, they would most likely not be compensated in court for such cases (Islamic 
Financial Services Board, 2010). In such an environment, it is argued that the controlling 
shareholders could extract rents from investment account holders (Karim & Archer, 2002). 
Furthermore, in the financing side, Islamic bank dividend payout policy is generally more 
constrained given the inadequacy of Shariah compatible financial instruments, a limited money 
market and wholesale funding. At the same time, prior studies point out that Islamic banks face 
higher risks on the asset side compared to conventional banks, including the complexity of 
Islamic loan covenants, moral hazard incentives and limited default penalties (Sundararajan & 
Errico, 2002). As a consequence, Islamic financial institutions could be forced to make higher 
                                                          
5 The provisions to the PER are calculated before the allocation of profits to the bank, shareholders and investment account 
holders. If the IRR is applied, provisions are deducted from the profits available for distribution to the account holders only 
after the bank retains its share of profits (Nienhaus, 2007). 
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use of equity and thus restrain from paying higher dividends to shareholders compared to 
conventional institutions other things being equal.  
 
2.2. Ownership identity and payout policy 
This paper examines the link between different types of ownership, i.e., government, 
foreign and family, on conventional vis-à-vis Islamic banks’ dividend payouts policy. In the 
case of government ownership, its effect on dividend policy is a debatable issue. On the one 
hand, drawing on agency theory, prior literature on non-financial firms generally acknowledges 
a negative effect of government ownership on dividend policy. This view claims that managers 
appointed by the government are not adequately monitored by the latter. Government is not 
only interested strictly in firm performance but also concerned about a high level of 
employment or promoting regional development. This is translated in a more conservative 
payout policy since managers could be tempted to not distribute dividends and use them for 
negative net present value projects, which would increase political support (Borisova, 
Brockman, Salas & Zagorchev, 2012). On the other hand, the government as an owner could 
be interested in increasing the dividend payout in order to alleviate agency problems especially 
those between minority shareholders and the management. Moreover, government-owned 
firms suffer less financing constraints since they enjoy easier access to debt financing 
(Bortolotti & Faccio, 2009; Chaney, Faccio & Parsley, 2011). Accordingly, they could pay 
higher dividends since they benefit from alternative sources of funds.  
With respect to ownership of financial institutions, the government faces another agency 
issue since it is acting also as an agent of its citizens. Given that higher dividend payouts 
increase the risk-taking of banks, the government can induce banks to retain their earnings in 
order to strengthen their capital base, and thus limit the risk shifting from owners to depositors. 
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This could prevent a reputational damage due to bank failures and costly restructuring by 
emergency loans or deposit protection schemes (Gugler, 2003; Onali et al., 2016). In this case, 
the government would be interested in lower dividend payouts, especially for undercapitalized 
banks.  
Prior studies have empirically attempted to examine the dividend policy of state-owned 
firms but the results are inconclusive. Wang, Manry and Wandler (2011) and Lam, Sami and 
Zhou (2012) show that Chinese non-financial firms with higher state ownership are more likely 
to pay dividends. However, Kouki and Guizani (2009), and Onali et al. (2016) provide evidence 
that government-owned banks are less likely to distribute higher dividends. Ben-Nasr (2015) 
shows that dividend payout ratios are negatively affected by government ownership especially 
in jurisdictions with poor legal protection of investors. Based on the above and assuming that 
bank stability is the primary objective for governments as owners, we state the following 
hypothesis: 
H1a: Government ownership negatively affects dividend payouts in conventional banks. 
As previously mentioned, the dividend policy of Islamic banks could be affected by higher 
agency costs and higher perceived riskiness of their business model. This could induce Islamic 
banks to maintain higher capital buffers vis-a-vis conventional counterparts (Sundararajan & 
Errico, 2002; Abedifar et al., 2015). Similarly, Iqbal and Molyneux (2005) argue that 
governments in the MENA region tend to implicitly support a strong Islamic banking industry, 
and hence, they are more interested in their stability rather than generous dividend payouts to 
shareholders.6 These arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
                                                          
6 Islamic banks have received continuous support from local governments in order to be able to compete with conventional 
banks. The first Islamic bank in Egypt, Nasser Social Bank, was directly created by the local government in 1971. Similarly, 
the first private Islamic bank, Dubai Islamic Bank received key support from the governments of UAE and Kuwait in 1971. 
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H1b: Government ownership negatively affects dividend payouts in Islamic banks. 
Early studies report that foreign investors generally face a high level of adverse selection 
and uncertainty with respect to their investments abroad due to the increased information 
asymmetries (Gehrig, 1993). Dividend policy can remarkably reduce the uncertainty associated 
with foreign investment decisions (Brennan & Thakor, 1990). High dividend payouts are also 
used by foreign investors as a mechanism to discipline managers by forcing them to limit over-
investment problems (Jensen, 1986). An alternative view premised on the dividend clientele 
theory assumes that foreign investors would rather invest in a corporation which adopts a 
generous dividend policy (Allen et al., 2000; Jeon et al., 2011). Further, the predominant 
foreign investor in emerging markets’ banking institutions is typically represented by financial 
entities such as commercial banks, investment banks, pension or mutual funds. All these 
institutions would invest based on rigid prudent-man rules, and they tend to have a preference 
for cash dividends (Woidtke, 2002).  
However, more recent studies have challenged these assumptions in a number of directions. 
First, institutional investors are not homogeneous in their strategies. That is, some of them tend 
to prefer low dividends if the investee firm has growth potential, privileging capital gain over 
dividend yield (Hankins, Flannery & Nimalendran, 2008; Huang & Paul, 2017). Second, banks 
as owners display different strategies compared to mutual or pension funds. They have a long 
lasting relationship with the investee corporation, and they usually have extensive board 
representation (Franks & Mayer, 2001). Therefore, banks as shareholders are able to mitigate 
agency issues due to their close ties with the management (Georgen, Renneboog, & da Silva, 
2005). In this case, there would be less need for higher dividends, or bank-owned local 




However, this literature has mainly concentrated on institutional domestic ownership, in 
which case banks could be able to remarkably reduce agency costs. In the case of foreign 
institutions, we argue that the risk of being expropriated by managers is not irrelevant. 
Moreover, part of the countries under scrutiny displays a high political risk, therefore it is 
plausible that foreign banks would encourage a more generous dividend policy compared to a 
domestic investment. Using a Taiwanese dataset, Lin and Shiu (2003) empirically report that 
foreign investors are more likely to invest in firms with low dividend yields, consistent with 
the findings of Grinstein and Michaely (2005) for U.S. companies. Manos (2002) in India, 
Short et al. (2002) for the U.K. and Jeon et al. (2011) in Korea, show that foreign investors 
prefer to invest in dividend-paying companies, and hence they observe higher payouts in 
foreign-owned firms in these markets. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2a: Foreign investor ownership positively affects dividend payouts in conventional banks. 
Regarding foreign owned Islamic banks, two additional factors could justify a generous 
dividend policy, i.e., (i) higher opaqueness in these institutions; and (ii) agency costs arising 
between controlling shareholders and PSIA holders. Under this setting, foreign owners have 
the incentive to behave like families (see below) and expropriate PSIA holders. Therefore, we 
state the following hypothesis: 
H2b: Foreign investor ownership positively affects dividend payouts in Islamic banks. 
Family ownership is the most common type of insider ownership in emerging countries 
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). According to the classic agency theory, families are directly 
involved in firm management, therefore there should be alignment of interests between 
shareholders and managers (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Oh, Chang & 
Martynov, 2011). However, other studies contend that families exhibit a strong inclination to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders, especially when control exceeds cash flow 
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rights (Faccio, Lang & Young, 2001a; Mancinelli & Ozkan, 2006). Attig, Boubakri, El Ghoul 
and Guedhami (2016) find that family owned firms are more likely to pay lower dividends in 
East Asian countries where minority investors are not sufficiently protected. Similar results are 
also documented for other jurisdictions including Latin America (Gonzales, Molina, Pablo & 
Rosso, 2017), Australia (Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski & Skully, 2009), and Continental Europe 
(Lepetit et al., 2017). These arguments suggest that family ownership is linked to lower payouts 
due to higher agency costs and rent extraction. Further, founding families could be unwilling 
to lose control by issuing new shares, therefore they could retain firm earnings and reduce 
payout ratios. 
The alternative view claims that family owners not necessarily reduce dividends under 
certain conditions. First, they could opt for generous payouts to signal future firm growth, or 
to project a credible reputation in the market especially in circumstances where legal protection 
of minority investors is poor. This strategy could be particularly useful if the corporation needs 
to access equity markets in the future (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). Second, dividends could 
be the main source of income for family members, if they are reluctant to sell shares because 
of the fear of control dilution of the firm. Michiels, Voordeckers, Lybaert and Steijvers (2014) 
support this view by demonstrating that family owners are not a homogenous group, whose 
members could have diverse objectives. Some of them could be actively involved in the firm, 
whereas others do not participate in the family business. The latter are generally more risk 
averse compared to the former, and this could generate intra-family conflicts especially when 
ownership within the family becomes dispersed. In this case, dividends can act as an alleviating 
tool in resolving these conflicts (Thomas, 2002). 
With respect to family-owned banks in the present study, we believe that the first theoretical 
approach is more plausible i.e., family ownership is linked to lower dividend payments due to 
agency costs. First, banks in these countries are part of conglomerates, and often they engage 
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in lending to affiliated firms at below market interest rates (Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 
2002). Given that investor protection in these countries is generally poor, and banks do not 
disclose adequate information about their inter-group transactions, it is in the interest of 
controlling owners to retain dividends rather than distribute them. Moreover, these banks either 
are not listed or do not frequently access local equity markets for additional funding, which 
reduces the need to build a reputation (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000; 
Gonzales et al., 2017). Hence, we hypothesize the following: 
H3a: Family ownership is associated with lower dividend payouts in conventional banks. 
With respect to Islamic banks, we acknowledge that they could suffer a different type albeit 
more severe agency cost compared to conventional ones based on the assumptions mentioned 
earlier, (see Section 2.1). The inadequate level of disclosure of these institutions about the 
returns of their assets, the extended use of profit smoothing does not allow PSIA holders to 
deduce the exact and the fair remuneration of their capital in presence of generous dividends 
to large family owners. Therefore, under this pattern, it is unlikely that PSIA holders would 
withdraw their funds and threaten the stability of the bank. Based on these arguments, we state 
the following hypothesis: 
H3b: Family ownership is associated with higher dividend payouts in Islamic banks. 
 
3. Data and research methodology 
3.1. Sample selection 
Following extant studies (e.g., Beck et al., 2013; Mollah, Hassan, Farooque & Mobarek, 
2017), we construct the sample by using the BvD Orbis Bank Focus database for the period 
from 2000 to 2015 for both listed and unlisted Islamic and conventional banks domiciled in 16 
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jurisdictions with dual banking systems.7 We initially retrieve from the database all Islamic 
banks operating in all countries. Based on that information, we include only countries with dual 
banking systems, which allows us to use country-year dummies to account for time variant 
fixed effects. We then select institutions which prepare consolidated bank statements. We 
exclude banks domiciled in Algeria, Syria and Iraq due to lack of adequate information. Finally, 
we exclude banks for which there were less than two observations and those that did not pay 
any dividend during the sample period. 8 Ownership of each bank and identity of the largest 
owners were sourced from the Orbis Bank Focus, Factset database, as well as hand-collected 
from bank websites, and the global directory mubasher.info.9 The final sample consists of 214 
conventional banks and 69 Islamic banks. Table 1 Panel A reports the construction of the 
sample, whilst Panel B presents the distribution of banks for each country. 
<insert Table 1 here> 
3.2. Dependent and explanatory variables 
Our dependent variable is cash dividends to total assets ratio, as in Abreu and Gulamhussen 
(2013).10 Our ownership explanatory variables, i.e., government, foreign and family, are three 
binary variables taking values 0/1 when the ownership stake is lower/higher than 25%.11 The 
25% cutoff rule is also used in the prior literature to indicate controlling ownership (Gugler, 
2003; Bremberger, Cambini, Gugler & Rondi, 2016). We calculate the proportion of 
                                                          
7 Banks were classified as Islamic or conventional according to the criteria used by Orbis Bank Focus. Further, we cross-
checked the information provided by Orbis Bank Focus with banks’ websites to ensure accuracy. We also examined the 
Thomson Reuters Zawya index which focuses exclusively on Islamic banks. We exclude years prior to 2000 given the scarcity 
of data on Islamic banks. 
8 Following Truong and Heaney (2007), we exclude banks which reported zero dividends during the whole sample period as 
these institutions generally are considered financially distressed.  
9 This website contains information about the ownership structure of listed firms in the MENA region where most of the banks 
in our sample are domiciled. 
10 Other proxies such as dividends to earnings ratio are subject to errors due to earnings manipulation, therefore we do not 
include them in the analysis (La Porta et al., 2000). In addition, several studies include stock repurchases as sometimes 
managers use them to allocate funds to shareholders for tax purposes (e.g., Jeon et al., 2011). However, in our sample stock 
repurchases were zero, therefore we concentrate only in dividends. In untabulated results, we use dividends normalized by 
total equity, and the results are qualitatively similar. 
11 The use of dummies instead of equity stakes is justified in the literature because over a certain threshold (i.e. 25%) it is not 
anymore relevant whether the stake is 30% or 60% to guarantee control of the corporation. 
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government ownership in bank i by multiplying the share of each shareholder in that bank by 
the share that the government owns in that shareholder. Then, the result is summed over the 
total shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2002; Cornett, Guo, Khaksari & 
Tehranian, 2010). A similar procedure is adopted to calculate foreign and family ownership.  
Following prior literature, we include a number of bank specific characteristics including 
size, average return on assets, historical growth of the gross loan portfolio, charter value, capital 
adequacy, and bank Z-score.  Dividend payouts are influenced by firm size, profitability and 
growth opportunities (Fama & French, 2001). Larger financial institutions are expected to be 
more stable as they can raise capital more easily in financial markets, and hence they should 
exhibit higher dividend ratios. Profitability should affect dividend payout in a similar way. 
Banking institutions that are growing fast might prefer to reinvest a higher percentage of their 
earnings, hence this variable is expected to negatively impact on cash dividends. The charter 
value should affect positively on the payout ratio according to the signaling view. That is, banks 
prefer to pay high dividends to signal higher expected growth. However, according to Acharya, 
Gujral, Kulkarni and Shin (2011) and Onali (2014), low charter values could catalyze moral 
hazard behavior in banks, and thus they would be more tempted to transfer funds from 
depositors to owners by shifting the risk of failure to the former. Alternatively, a high charter 
value as a proxy of future growth could push banks to retain earnings in anticipation of future 
capital needs (Abreu & Gulamhussen, 2013). A proxy of capital adequacy (common equity to 
total assets) is included in order to account for regulatory pressure.12 It induces banks to limit 
moral hazard behavior. Dividends could also be used by private banks as a risk shifting 
mechanism in transferring default risk to creditors (depositors) or to the taxpayers through 
insurance schemes (Kanas, 2013; Ashraf, Bibi & Zheng, 2016). Undercapitalized banks are 
                                                          




forced by regulators to improve their ratios, hence bank capitalization should positively affect 
payouts (Bessler & Nohel, 1996; Theis & Dutta, 2009; Abreu & Gulamhussen, 2013). Finally, 
the natural log of the Z-score is included as a measure of risk taking. Default risk increases in 
presence of higher dividends, because they decrease the value of the equity (Merton, 1977; 
Onali, 2014). Therefore, we expect that higher Z-scores (lower bank riskiness) would 
negatively affect dividend payouts.  
Furthermore, we consider two country-level characteristics which could influence dividend 
payouts. First, we use an indicator of deposit insurance generosity (Demirgüc-Kunt & 
Detragiache, 2002) which aims to measure the likelihood of opportunistic behavior of banks 
when the deposit insurance is not well structured. Privately owned banks could be encouraged 
to adopt more risky strategies when they assume that the bank would be bailed out via the 
insurance mechanism (Demirgüc-Kunt & Detragiache, 2002).13 Dividend payments are one of 
the ways through which private owners could transfer bank risk default to depositors, bond 
holders, or taxpayers as it weakens bank capital and exposes the bank to potential default. In 
the case of Islamic banks, they are generally not covered by deposit insurance in dual banking 
countries (Cihák & Hesse, 2010). However, recent evidence suggests that the authorities have 
introduced comprehensive deposit insurance covering Islamic banks in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan and Turkey (IADI, 2010). Therefore, we include a second dummy 
variable for these countries indicating the presence of a safety net for Islamic banks. Finally, 
we include in the analysis a proxy for banks’ supervisory authority powers as described in 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004). It aims to assess whether authorities in each country have the 
right to take appropriate actions to address the problems.14 The higher the value of the index, 
                                                          
13 These features include exclusive public sector participation, no coinsurance by banks, interbank deposits and coverage of 
foreign currency, and high coverage limits.  
14 These actions include the right of the authority to force a change in the bank organizational structure, impose limits to 
dividends, bonuses for managers, suspend ownership rights is a troubled bank, declare the bank insolvent, remove and replace 
managers or directors. 
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the broader is the spectrum of action of the supervisory authority. Table 2 provides the list of 
variables used in this study. 
<insert Table 2 here> 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample, and for each bank type after 
winsorizing variables at the 1% and 99% percentile for each country. The Mann-Whitney tests 
provide comparisons of the means across the two samples.15 The results suggest that the two 
populations exhibit significant differences in terms of payout policies, historical growth of the 
loan portfolio, charter value, capital adequacy ratios, and Z-score. On average, Islamic banks 
pay less dividends, experience higher loan growth, lower charter value, higher capitalization 
and profitability, and lower Z-scores. The average stake of family and foreign institutions is 
lower in Islamic banks. The statistics are similar to those reported in prior works, e.g., Mollah 
et al. (2017). Regarding banks in other jurisdictions, Onali (2014) reports that banks domiciled 
in U.S. and the European Union generally display higher Z-scores, lower capitalization, similar 
profitability, higher charter values compared to banks examined in our study. 
<insert Table 3 here> 
3.3 Model specification 
The previous literature (Athari et al., 2016; Bremberger et al., 2017) acknowledges that 
firms set the payout policy in line with the model introduced by Litner (1956). That is, current 
dividends are the result of a partial adjustment of last year’s dividend towards a target payout 
ratio. Given that the first lag of the dependent variable is included among the explanatory 
variables, the pooled OLS is not an appropriate model because errors would be correlated with 
the explanatory variables generating biased estimates of the covariates. The GMM model 
                                                          
15 We opted for the Mann-Whitney test because the Jarque-Bera test for assumption of normality of the covariates was rejected. 
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introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and refined later by Blundell and Bond (1998) is an 
appropriate specification to mitigate these problems. In particular, we use the GMM-SYS 
(Blundell & Bond, 1998) which estimates a system of first differences and level equations 
where the former uses lags of variables in levels and the latter lags of first-differenced variables 
as instruments (Onali, 2014).16 Following Knyazeva (2006) and Bremberger et al. (2017), we 
adopt a robust specification which controls for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of the 
standard errors as follows: 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜌𝐼𝐵 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑𝐼𝐵 ∗ ∑ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
3






𝑖=1 + 𝜂𝑖 +
𝑖,𝑡            (1)
         
where i, k and t represent the bank, country and the year, respectively. Xi represents the 
ownership dummies Gov, Foreign and Family. IB is a dummy variable taking value one for 
Islamic banks. Fi,t represent the bank specific controls, whereas Ck is a vector of country 
controls. The error terms consist of a bank specific effect (ηi) and an idiosyncratic component. 
Among the bank controls, bank capitalization and Z-score are considered as endogenous, 
whereas growth as a predetermined variable.17 We seek to limit the proliferation of instruments 
by adopting the collapsing approach, as proposed by Roodman (2009).18  
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Baseline regressions 
                                                          
16 The GMM-SYS is more apt when the persistency of the dependent variable is strong, i.e., the autoregressive parameter is 
large (Bremberger et al., 2017; Daher, Masih & Ibrahim, 2015). 
17 Endogenous variables are influenced by current errors, whereas predetermined variables only with past disturbances. Growth 
of the loan portfolio could be influenced by past dividends as they limit the amount of capital that can be invested by the bank. 




Table 4 reports our baseline regressions. Column I presents the results for the full sample 
i.e., without differentiating the two types of bank, and in Column II, the interaction terms are 
included between the IB and ownership variables.19  The results in Column I indicate that the 
coefficients of both government and family are negative and significant at 10% and 5%, 
respectively, whereas the coefficient of foreign ownership is not significant. The main effects 
for conventional banks in Column II show the coefficients of both government and family 
remain negative and significant. This is in-line with H1a and H3a, which implies that state and 
family shareholders encourage lower dividends in conventional financial institutions. These 
coefficients are economically significant as they suggest that on average dividends normalized 
by total assets are around 32% lower in state-owned conventional banks compared to widely-
held ones, other things being equal. In the case of family-owned institutions this percentage is 
around 34%.20 The coefficient of foreign ownership is not significant, hence it is not consistent 
with H2a.   
With respect to Islamic banks, the IB dummy is negative and significant indicating that on 
average these institutions pay lower dividends compared to conventional ones. In the case of 
the interactive terms, the results show that IB*Gov is not significant, whereas IB*Foreign and 
IB*Family have a significance level of 10% and 5%, respectively. In both cases, privately 
owned Islamic banks are positively linked to payouts, which is consistent with H2b and H3b. 
On average, dividends are 11.5% (23.7%) higher in foreign (family) owned Islamic banks 
compared to a similar widely-held institution.21 Both outcomes indicate a potential 
expropriation of PSIA holders. In foreign-owned Islamic banks, the results also support the 
                                                          
19 In untabulated results, we first test a simple modified version of the original Litner model where we include the 
autoregressive term, return on assets, the IB dummy and interact it with the other two variables. The results imply that the 
smoothing pattern is stronger for conventional banks. There does not seem to be a strong effect i.e., the coefficient on earnings 
is low. The interactive term (IB*NI) is not significant implying a similarity between the two groups. In summary, the 
adjustment towards a target payout ratio is rather slow but not too different across both types. 
20 We calculate these percentages by a mean value decomposition technique as in Holgersson, Norman and Tavassoli (2014). 
21 We cannot assume that dividends in Islamic (foreign or family owned) banks are higher than in conventional counterparts, 




fear of expropriation of non-domestic investors by bank managers which can be curbed by 
generous bank dividends.  
The insignificant effect of IB*Gov suggests that government ownership has a similar but 
negative impact across the two groups which confirms H1b. We can conclude that the results 
suggest a likely harmful role of dividends in privately owned Islamic banks. In both types of 
banks, family owners tend to adopt a dividend policy which suits better their interests. This 
would adversely affect minority shareholders and PSIA holders, in the case of conventional 
and Islamic banks, respectively. Regarding government owned banks, we assume that these 
owners adopt a more prudent policy aiming at having highly capitalized banks in their 
jurisdictions. This could be the main priority for governments rather than distributing dividends 
to reduce agency costs. 
In terms of control variables, current dividends are positively influenced by bank earnings 
although the coefficients are lower as compared to previous studies (Athari et al., 2016; 
Bremberger et al., 2017). As expected, the coefficient of size (Ln_asset) is positive, whereas 
growth is negative. Positive signs are observed for bank capital and Z-score in line with 
previous research (Ashraf et al., 2016). Hence, we do not observe a risk-shifting mechanism 
here as other studies have found (Onali, 2014). The sign for deposit insurance and supervisory 
powers is positive albeit not significant. The post-estimation tests confirm the validity of our 
model as the ar2, the Sargan and Hansen tests are all not significant. The Wald tests suggest 
that both IB*Foreign and IB*Family are significantly different from zero (at the 10% and 5% 
level, respectively). 
<insert Table 4 here> 
The previous literature has found that main differences between conventional and Islamic 
financial institutions could be driven by bank size (Cihák & Hesse, 2010; Beck et al., 2013 and 
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Abedifar et al., 2013). Smaller Islamic financial institutions seem to be less risky than their 
conventional counterparts. However, the size effect reverses for larger ones. Hence, we decide 
to split our sample in two sub-groups based on bank size median value for each year.  
The findings reported in Table 5 indicate that dividend policy is significantly linked to large 
banks. On the one side, state-owned large conventional banks pay lower dividends which is 
consistent with the fact that governments put more pressure on the stability of large 
conventional institutions and therefore encourage a more conservative dividend policy. Family 
ownership is significantly associated with lower dividends as well. With respect to Islamic 
banks, the results suggest that they generally retain a higher proportion of their profits in both 
groups (IB dummy is significant for small and large banks). We again observe that the impact 
of government ownership is statistically not different with conventional banks, whereas foreign 
and family shareholders are associated with higher payouts but only in large Islamic 
institutions. The effect is much stronger for family-owned banks where expropriation of PSIA 
holders seems to be more severe. The reason why small private banks (conventional and 
Islamic) expropriate less minority shareholders and PSIA holders, respectively, could plausibly 
be due to their efforts to establish a good reputation and the existence of more severe financial 
constraints compared to large banks which have access also to other sources of capital. In 
particular, small Islamic banks are more vulnerable to a reduction of investment accounts, 
therefore we do not find evidence of dividends used as an expropriation tool in them. The 
findings are consistent with previous studies (Cihak & Hesse, 2010), implying that one of the 
reasons that large Islamic financial institutions tend to be more risky is that part of them 
(privately owned) adopts a more generous dividend policy which weakens their capital base 
and indirectly worsens their stability. 




5. Robustness tests 
5.1. Corporate governance and other country specific controls 
Previous literature has demonstrated that dividend policy could be related to firm-specific 
corporate governance factors (Knyazeva, 2006; Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Onali et al., 2016). In 
particular, the role of managers and CEO power seems to exert a positive effect on non-
financial firms’ dividends because entrenched CEOs use dividends to protect them against 
disciplinary actions from shareholders, and thus decrease their monitoring incentives 
(Elyasiani & Zhang, 2013). Knyazeva (2006) finds that in poorly governed firms, where there 
is misalignment of interest between managers and shareholders, the former would decide to 
disburse cash to the latter in order to limit the probability of being fired. However, this is 
conditional on strong shareholder rights as La Porta et al. (2000) report in their seminal study. 
With respect to financial institutions, the effect of CEO entrenchment and misalignment is 
more ambiguous as banks are also monitored by the government as previously mentioned. 
Therefore, CEO misalignment could generate lower payouts if CEO’s main objective is to 
reduce government monitoring rather than shareholder pressure. Here, we construct a corporate 
governance index, which is similar to that adopted by Knyazeva (2006), and Mollah et al. 
(2017).22  Higher values of the score indicate more misalignment between the management and 
bank shareholders.  
<insert Table 6 here> 
                                                          
22 This variable is constructed based on six governance indicators, i.e., (i) board size; (ii) independent directors; (iii) CEO 
tenure; (iv) CEO age; (v) large blockholder; and (vi) other blockholder. For Islamic banks, we also include a measure of 
Shariah board size which takes value of one for large boards as an indicator of poor monitoring and zero otherwise. All 
governance data was retrieved from the Factset database. 
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Table 6 Columns I-VI report that main variables of interest confirm the baseline findings.23 
The interaction results in Column I show that IB*Foreign is not significant whereas IB*Family 
is now significant only at the 10% level. Interestingly, the misalignment variable is negative, 
indicating that poor corporate governance is linked to lower payouts in banks. This is similar 
to the results of Onali et al. (2016) for EU banks, and suggest that misaligned CEOs tend to 
reduce payouts because they assign a higher priority to government pressure rather than 
shareholders.  
In the next columns, we test a battery of other controls which could influence bank 
dividends. In Column II, we include an index of investor protection from the World Bank 
Doing Business indicators (IP). It takes values 0-100 where the higher value implies better 
protection of minority shareholders. In Column III, we split this indicator in three sub-indices 
as in Athari et al. (2016).24 It seems that directors’ liability and shareholders suits index exert 
a positive effect on dividend payouts. We add a series of bank capital requirements from the 
World Bank Database on Bank Regulation in column IV, given that Ashraf et al. (2016) report 
that the national regulatory framework on capital adequacy influences the setting of bank 
dividend policies.25  
In Column V, we consider another similar measure which takes the value of one if the 
regulatory authority has the power to cut bank dividends even after the management has opted 
for dividend payment. Lastly, in Column VI, we include three measures of national culture 
(Hofstede, 2001), given that recent evidence suggests they could indirectly influence dividend 
                                                          
23 Unfortunately, we have data on bank governance only for listed banks, hence our sample is considerably smaller. 
24 Disclosure index (d_index) measures the approval and transparency of business related transactions. Directors’ liability 
index (dir_li) measures the liability of firm directors in case of self-dealing activities. Shareholders’ suit index (s_suit) 
measures the shareholders’ ability to obtain corporate documents prior to and during litigation. All indices take values from 0 
to 10 and higher values reflect higher investor protection.  
25 The first variable (ovr_cap) measures whether the capital requirement reflects Basle guidelines and is determined after 
deducting a number of market value losses. Init_cap measures whether initial bank capitalization can include certain funds.  
Cap_reg is the sum of the previous two. Higher values indicate greater stringency rules for all variables. 
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policy in a certain country (Byrne & O’Connor, 2017).26 Interestingly, we find that in higher 
individualistic countries, dividends are lower in line with their study. In these jurisdictions, 
agency costs are higher, because managers are more prone to act on their self-interest by 
expropriating minority shareholders.27   
 
5.2.    Other endogeneity issues 
The decision of a foreign bank to invest in an emerging market’s financial institution might 
be correlated with some other factors such as bank profitability, which in turn determines 
payout ratios and thus, would render the coefficient of Foreign in our base model inconsistent 
because of cross-causality (Havrylchyk & Jurzyk, 2011).28 Consequently, we perform a 
propensity matching technique with a difference-in-difference (DID) estimator. In estimating 
the propensity score, we use a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is set to 
one if a foreign investor acquired more than 25% of the equity stake in the investee bank and 
zero otherwise (Table 7). We choose a number of explanatory variables based on the previous 
studies analyzing factors that affect cross-border acquisitions of financial institutions (Buch & 
DeLong, 2004; Lanine & Vander Vennet, 2007). Accordingly, we include bank profitability 
(NI), capitalization (Capital), and bank size (Ln_asset). We then control for a set of country-
specific variables that are considered to influence foreign direct investment, such as the ratio 
of non-financial FDI to total GDP (FDI), the average real lending rate in the country (RATE), 
                                                          
26 Power distance (pow_dist) expresses acceptance from the society that power can be distributed unequally. Higher values 
indicate higher level of endorsement of the hierarchical order. The uncertainty avoidance index (un_avoid) indicates to what 
extent members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertain and ambiguous situations. Individualism/collectivism (ind_coll) 
takes higher values in individualistic societies where everyone is expected to take care of him (her) self. Lower values indicate 
societies where individuals pursue a collectivist goal. 
27 We must acknowledge that in this specification, the main variables of interest are no longer statistically significant, which 
is plausibly due to the smaller sample. Culture indices in Hofstede (2001) are not available for all countries in our sample. 
Moreover, Arab countries are grouped together and thus, have a unique score.  
28 We could not instrument foreign ownership in the GMM specification because the STATA command xtabond2 that we 
used, cannot accommodate external instruments. 
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the real GDP growth (GDP_GR), the log of host country GDP per capita (GDP_PC), an 
indicator of protection of investor rights in the country (IP as in Section 5.1) (Havrylchyk & 
Jurzyk, 2011). All explanatory variables are lagged one year.29  
It can be observed that some of the variables that impact foreign entry in emerging markets 
show a potential selection bias. Foreign investors express interest for large, profitable and well-
capitalized banks, all factors that influence investee banks’ payout policy. In terms of country 
specific variables, it seems that the GDP growth and GDP per capita exert a negative impact. 
This could be the result of the choice to concentrate on low growth countries where banks can 
be acquired at a low price. Moreover, even governments permit foreign entry in the banking 
sector in the wake of a financial crisis, when some banks need to be bailed out due to financial 
difficulties. As a higher real lending rate proxies for an inefficient banking sector with high 
opportunities, foreign investors find this promising as they could cut costs and increase bank 
profits. 
<insert Table 7 here> 
Finally, by implementing a difference-in-difference regression, we calculate the means of 
an outcome variable on the two samples and apply a t-test where the null hypothesis is that the 
difference in means is zero (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). This allows us to infer the causal 
effect of the treatment variable on the outcome, which is referred to as the Average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT).  
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(𝑦1 |𝑇 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑦0 |𝑇 = 1)                                     (2) 
                                                          




This should be the difference between the payout ratio of bank that was acquired by a 
foreign investor 𝐸(𝑦1 |𝑇 = 1), and the analogous outcome of a similar bank that remained in 
domestic hands. 
Before running the DID regression, we ensure that the balancing property is satisfied. This 
implies that the average values of our instruments need to be statistically similar between the 
treatment and control group, otherwise we cannot assume that exposure to the treatment is 
random. In other words, acquired banks and matched non-acquired ones need to have similar 
characteristics in order to have a consistent estimator of the treatment. Consequently, we run 
the DID regression where the dependent variable is the payout ratio of conventional or Islamic 
financial institutions, conditional on the fact that a foreign investor has acquired an equity stake 
higher than 25% in year t (Table 8). We perform in both cases a PSM with nearest neighbor 
method which is based on finding the units for which the propensity score is the closest (Jeon 
et al., 2011). The results indicate that payout ratios of financial institutions are significantly 
higher anytime a foreign investor acquires more than 25% of the voting rights.30 This confirms 
the outcome of previous regressions for foreign investors in Islamic banks and supports H2b. 
The results for conventional banks are weaker, only significant at the 10% level but they are in 
line with H2a.  
<insert Table 8 here> 
6. Conclusions 
We explore how ownership identity affects dividend policy in Islamic and conventional 
financial institutions in 16 jurisdictions with dual banking systems. In doing so, we use a hand-
collected ownership dataset of these institutions over the period 2000 – 2015. Our results 
                                                          
30 In untabulated results, we measure the ATT one year after the foreign acquisition to allow for a transition effect but the 
results are qualitatively similar. 
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indicate that payout policy is influenced by the type of shareholder, but not in the same way in 
Islamic and conventional banks. Government and family ownership impact negatively on the 
dividend policy of conventional banks. Governments are generally interested in bank stability, 
they seek to avoid poorly capitalized banks, rather than reducing agency costs in investee 
banks, and therefore they privilege lower payouts. Family ownership, as expected, reduces 
dividends which is a signal of expropriation of minority shareholders. In the case of Islamic 
banks, we find that they generally pay lower dividends than conventional ones. However, 
foreign and family-owned Islamic banks are associated with higher dividends whereas the 
payout policy of state-owned ones is similar to that of conventional institutions. The behavior 
of private Islamic financial institutions can be interpreted as a way to expropriate PSIA holders 
which are the most exploited from generous dividends. These results persist even after 
controlling for other variables including corporate governance, investor protection, regulatory 
authority powers, or generosity of deposit insurance in each jurisdiction. After splitting banks 
based on median sample size, we notice that the results are mainly driven by large banks. This 
provides additional support to previous literature about the lower stability of large Islamic 
banks. 
This study is one of the first attempts that investigate the dividend payout policy in dual 
banking countries. We argue that Islamic banks present a different type of agency cost, which 
is not present in conventional institutions and has not been addressed by prior research 
adequately. It seems that their dividend policy can be explained under the light of this 
difference with conventional banks. The results of this paper can assist in enhancing our 
understanding of the role of different types of investors in the payout policy of financial 
institutions, especially in countries with dual banking systems. Different owners might have 
different concerns regarding agency costs, or bank stability.  
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Islamic banks are becoming more mature, but their regulatory framework is still 
experiencing an on-going improvement. There are also a wide range of differences across 
jurisdictions on how Islamic banks are regulated. Anecdotal evidence indicates that investment 
account holders do not enjoy an adequate protection compared to deposit holders in 
conventional institutions. They do not have any governance mechanism that adequately 
protects them, nor do they receive full disclosure about the risk and return of their investment.  
Dividend policy is a mechanism driven by these issues and could be used by controlling 
shareholders in their interest.  
Our research work has important implications for both regulators and market participants. 
Regulators should take further steps in improving the quality of governance and regulatory 
framework of Islamic financial institutions. In particular, more disclosure on the use of PER 
and IRR reserves in Islamic banks should be mandated given that their adoption considerably 
affects returns of both PSIA holders and owners. The lack of transparency on the use of these 
reserves has undermined an appropriate assessment of the distribution of profits between these 
two types of investors. In addition, investors and analysts should take into consideration the 
roles of Shariah framework in analyzing payout policies of Islamic financial institutions as 
well as policies with respect to the remuneration of common shareholders and investment 
account holders.  
Our study has two caveats that provide avenues for future research. First, data on PER and 
IRR are not currently available for the majority of Islamic banks in this study. Future research 
could examine dividend policies of Islamic banks by including the use of these reserves in the 
models. Future research may also focus on examining, for instance, specific enforcement 
actions taken by Shariah boards related to the use of these reserves and distribution of profits 
between PSIA holders and common shareholders. Finally, governance data used in this study 
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is generally available only for listed banks, hence future research could explore the possibility 
of constructing similar governance indicators for non-listed banks. 
 
 
Table 1  
Sample selection and distribution of banks by country 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 
Search criteria Conventional banks Islamic banks 
 
Dual banking countries 395 210 
Less: 





     Insufficient data (Iraq, Algeria, Syria) (14) (3) 
     Missing dividends and less than  









Panel B: Number of banks for each country 
 
Country                                 Conventional banks Islamic banks 
Bahrain 9 8 
Bangladesh 12 3 
Egypt 21 5 
Indonesia 6 2 
Jordan 14 4 
Kuwait 7 6 
Lebanon 31 2 
Malaysia 15 7 
Oman 11 2 
Pakistan 9 4 
Qatar 9 4 
Saudi Arabia 10 4 
Sudan 3 5 
Tunisia 17 1 
Turkey 19 3 
United Arab Emirates 21 9 




Table 2  
List of variables  
Variables Definition Data source 
Gov The value equal to one if the Government or 
Government agencies have an equity stake 
(direct or indirect) ≥ 25%, otherwise zero. 
Orbis Bank Focus, 
Factset and other 
websites 
Foreign The value equal to one if foreign investors 
have an equity stake (direct or indirect) ≥ 
25%, otherwise zero. 
Orbis Bank Focus, 
Factset and other 
websites 
Family The value equal to one if local families have 
an equity stake (direct or indirect) higher or 
equal to 25%, otherwise zero. 
Orbis Bank Focus, 
Factset and other 
websites 
Div_asset Cash dividends paid during the financial year 
normalized by bank total assets 
Orbis Bank Focus 
IB The value equal to one for Islamic banks, 
otherwise zero. 
Orbis Bank Focus and 
other websites 
NI Net income normalized by total assets Orbis BankFocus 
Ln_asset Natural log of total assets Orbis BankFocus 
Growth (GLPt – GLPt-1)/GLPt-1 Orbis BankFocus 
Charter The value equal to one if the ratio of 
customer deposits to total assets is larger 
than the country-year sample median, 
otherwise zero. 
Orbis BankFocus 
Capital Common shareholders equity normalized by 
total assets 
Orbis BankFocus 
Ln_Z Natural log of the Z score. Z score is 
measured following Leaven and Levine 
(2009). 
Z = (NI + Capital)/Std. dev. NI. We calculate 
the average of each variable for each bank 
during the sample period. 
Orbis BankFocus 
Dep_ins The value equal to one if a country adopts a 
generous deposit insurance, otherwise zero. 
World Bank database 
on Bank Regulation 
I_dep_ins The value equal to one if a country adopts 
Islamic deposit insurance, otherwise zero. 
IADI (2010) 
Power The value equal to one if a country is in the 
higher quantile of Authority supervisory 
powers, otherwise zero. 
World Bank database 

















 N Mean Median Std. Dev  N Mean Median Std. Dev  N Mean Median Std. Dev   
Gov 3008 0.248 0.000 0.432  2306 0.232 0.000 0.422  702 0.305 0.000 0.461  0.000*** 
Foreign 3008 0.310 0.000 0.462  2306 0.332 0.000 0.471  702 0.230 0.000 0.421  0.000*** 
Family 3008 0.178 0.000 0.382  2306 0.191 0.000 0.393  702 0.132 0.000 0.338  0.000*** 
Div_asset 3008 0.004 0.000 0.007  2306 0.005 0.001 0.007  702 0.004 0.000 0.007  0.000*** 
NI 2943 0.015 0.013 0.018  2301 0.014 0.013 0.015  642 0.017 0.013 0.025  0.173 
Ln_asset 3008 21.883 21.945 1.654  2306 21.904 21.929 1.637  702 21.811 22.045 1.712  0.827 
Growth 2641 0.293 0.108 2.910  2078 0.177 0.100 0.619  563 0.721 0.157 6.174  0.000*** 
Charter 3008 0.506 1.000 0.500  2306 0.531 1.000 0.499  702 0.415 0.000 0.493  0.000*** 
Capital 2646 0.140 0.113 0.112  2004 0.129 0.110 0.093  642 0.180 0.130 0.155  0.000*** 
Ln_Z 2933 3.097 3.152 0.808  2291 3.171 3.227 0.793  642 2.833 2.729 0.807  0.000*** 
Power 3008 0.365 0.000 0.481  2306 0.359 0.000 0.480  702 0.387 0.000 0.488  0.182 
Dep_ins 3008 0.179 0.000 0.384  2306 0.167 0.000 0.373  702 0.222 0.000 0.416  0.001*** 
I_dep_ins 3008 0.204 0.000 0.403  2306 0.168 0.000 0.374  638 0.334 0.000 0.472  0.000*** 
 Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for a set of variables used in the present study for the period 2000-2015. ***, **, and * denote significance of the test at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 











               Table 4  
                Baseline regressions 
 
 
All banks Interaction effects 
Gov -0.006* -0.007* 
 (-1.75) (-1.76) 
Foreign 0.009 0.002 
 (1.41) (1.34) 
Family -0.007** -0.009*** 
 (-2.08) (-2.62) 
IB*Gov  0.005 
  (0.65) 
IB*Foreign  0.002* 
  (1.66) 
IB*Family  0.017** 
  (2.37) 
IB  -0.007* 
  (-1.75) 
L.Div_asset 0.554*** 0.556*** 
 (6.96) (6.63) 
L.IB*Div_asset  -0.311 
  (-1.49) 
NI 0.076*** 0.073*** 
 (2.63) (2.86) 
Ln_asset 0.002** 0.004** 
 (2.54) (2.51) 
Growth -0.002** -0.008** 
 (-2.42) (-2.31) 
Charter -0.002 -0.002* 
 (-1.55) (-1.72) 
Capital 0.005* 0.001** 
 (1.83) (2.16) 
Ln_Z 0.003* 0.003* 
 (1.72) (1.69) 
Power 0.002 0.002 
 (0.58) (0.55) 
Dep_ins 0.007* 0.008 
 (1.74) (1.68) 
I_dep_ins 0.002 0.001 
 (0.57) (0.26) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes 
   
N 2310 2310 
Instruments 65 69 
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F test 49.62 47.77 
p-value of F test  0.000 0.000 
AR1 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.65 0.641 
Sargan  0.827 0.800 
Hansen 0.61 0.566 
Wald IB*Gov  0.517 
Wald IB*Foreign  0.074* 
Wald IB*Family  0.018** 
Notes: This table reports the results for two GMM-SYS regressions where the dependent variable 
is the dividends to total assets ratio (Div_asset). Definitions of variables are provided in Table 2. 
In Column I, we consider all banks, whereas in Column II we include interaction effects which 
measure the impact of Islamic banks. T-tests are shown in parentheses below each coefficient. 






 Table 5  
 GMM-SYS regressions between small and large banks 
 Small banks Large banks 
Gov -0.043 -0.045* 
 (-0.48) (-1.79) 
Foreign 0.031 0.073 
 (0.18) (1.51) 
Family -0.060 -0.091*** 
 (-0.84) (-2.73) 
IB*Gov -0.009 0.007 
 (-0.33) (1.36) 
IB*Foreign 0.034 0.019* 
 (1.05) (1.79) 
IB*Family 0.417 0.182*** 
 (0.25) (4.01) 
IB -0.011** -0.078** 
 (-2.04) (-2.10) 
L.Div_asset 0.439*** 0.693*** 
 (4.02) (8.87) 
L.IB*Div_asset -0.164 -0.075 
 (-0.89) (-0.79) 
NI 0.063** 0.061** 
 (2.60) (2.05) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year and country effects Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes 
N 1047 1263 
Instruments 69 69 
F test 11.86 122.1 
p-value of F test 0.000 0.000 
AR1 0.001 0.000 
AR2 0.774 0.368 
Sargan 0.615 0.716 
Hansen 0.288 0.237 
Wald IB*Gov 0.684 0.175 
Wald IB*Foreign 0.142 0.038** 
Wald IB * Family 0.532 0.000*** 
   
Notes: This table reports the results for two GMM-SYS regressions where the dependent variable is the dividends to 
total assets ratio (Div_asset). Definitions of variables are provided in Table 2. In each regression we include country 
and year dummies. We also include as controls Growth, Charter, Capital, Ln_Z, Power, Dep_ins and I_dep_ins.  T-
tests are shown in parentheses below each coefficient. ***, **, and * denote significance of the test at the 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 6  
Robustness tests – Controlling for bank- and country-specific variables 
 I II III IV V VI 
Gov -0.008* -0.008* -0.005* -0.006* -0.007* -0.006 
 (-1.66) (-1.87) (-1.68) (-1.73) (-1.77) (-1.49) 
Foreign 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.006 
 (0.09) (0.69) (0.81) (0.46) (0.37) (0.87) 
Family -0.008** -0.001** -0.007* -0.008** -0.009** -0.006 
 (-2.40) (-2.40) (-1.70) (-2.36) (-2.21) (-0.83) 
IB*Gov 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.003 
 (0.37) (0.67) (0.48) (0.96) (0.80) (0.36) 
IB*Foreign 0.001 0.003* 0.003* 0.002* 0.002* 0.007 
 (1.06) (1.68) (1.84) (1.69) (1.78) (1.45) 
IB*Family 0.011* 0.019** 0.015* 0.016** 0.017** 0.061 
 (1.81) (2.23) (1.93) (2.24) (2.31) (0.90) 
IB -0.004 -0.009* -0.002*** -0.008** -0.008* -0.007 
 (-1.51) (-1.92) (-2.65) (-1.97) (-1.89) (-0.81) 
L.div_asset 0.585*** 0.487*** 0.543*** 0.552*** 0.557*** 0.590*** 
 (7.54) (5.10) (6.28) (6.23) (6.86) (6.95) 
L.IB*div_asset -0.288** -0.237 -0.226 -0.289 -0.303 -0.097 
 (-2.00) (-1.34) (-1.16) (-1.35) (-1.45) (-0.55) 
NI 0.074*** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.055*** 
 (2.90) (3.03) (2.64) (2.63) (2.79) (3.10) 
Misalignment -0.004*      
 (-1.75)      
IP  -0.001     
  (-0.11)     
d_index   0.006    
   (0.10)    
dir_li   0.002***   
   (3.23)    
s_suit   0.002*    
   (1.92)    
ovr_cap    -0.002   
    (-1.30)   
init_cap    0.003   
    (0.92)   
cap_reg    0.008   
    (0.49)   
sup_div     0.002  
     (0.35)  
pow_dist      0.005 
      (1.52) 
un_avoid      0.002 
      (0.52) 
ind_coll      -0.005* 
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      (-1.94) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 1533 1783 1991 2310 2310 1438 
Instruments 70 66 69 72 70 72 
F test 78.23 41.25 59.90 46.34 46.85 48.37 
p-value of F test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.566 0.690 0.953 0.646 0.640 0.771 
Sargan 0.679 0.463 0.542 0.813 0.800 0.957 
Hansen 0.511 0.421 0.445 0.520 0.582 0.586 
Wald IB*Gov 0.713 0.506 0.632 0.34 0.97 0.72 
Wald IB*Foreign 0.29 0.094 0.06 0.083 0.078 0.655 
Wald IB*Family 0.227 0.026 0.054 0.026 0.065 0.369 
       
Notes: This table reports the results for a series of GMM-SYS regressions where the dependent variable is the 
dividends to total assets ratio (Div_asset). In each regression, we include country and year dummies. We also 
include as controls Growth, Charter, Capital, Ln_Z, Power, Dep_ins and I_dep_ins.  T-tests are shown in 





Table 7  
The dependent variable is a dummy indicating a foreign acquisition of a stake higher than 
25% in an investee bank (conventional or Islamic). 




Coef. Marginal  
effects 
     
Ln_asset 0.164 0.010 1.391*** 0.079  
(1.20) 3.03 (3.47)  3.52 
 
NI 1.128*** 1.085 2.576 2.009 
 
 
(4.95) 3.37 (1.50) 1.49 
 
Capital 1.806*** 1.170 1.136 0.065 
 
 
(3.71) 3.69 (0.19) 0.19 
 
RATE 0.143** 0.009 0.191** 0.010 
 
 
(2.42) 2.41 (2.01) 2.01 
 
FDI 0.087 0.006 -0.192 -0.011 
 
 
(1.17) 1.17 (-1.01) -1.02 
 
GDP_PC -1.059*** -0.068 -0.793** -0.045 
 
 
(-3.39) -3.35 (-2.02) -2.06 
 
GDP_GR -0.232*** -0.015 0.049 0.028 
 
 
(-2.62) -2.61 (0.58) 058 
 
IP 0.082*** 0.053 0.042 0.023 
 
 
(2.95) 2.93 (1.08) 1.09 
 
Intercept -0.853  -3.79*** 
  
 
(-0.27)  (-3.61) 
  
     
Observations 766  227 
  
chi2 83.21  30.08 
  
Pseudo R2 0.193  0.249 
  
Notes: This table reports the results of two logistic regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy taking value 
one if during a certain year a foreign investor acquires more than 25% of the equity stake of a bank in our sample. T-
tests are shown in parentheses below each coefficient. ***, ** and * denote coefficient significance at the 1%, 5%, and 




Table 8  
Difference-in-difference estimator of the payout policy of Islamic vs conventional banks based 
on the propensity score matching 
Differences in payout policy based on ownership identity   
   
Type  nearest neighbor    
 
Instrumental variables : Ln_asset, NI, Capital, RATE, FDI, GDP_PC, GDP_GR, IP 
      
 Panel A Panel B  
Outcome:  Conventional banks Islamic banks  
    
 Div_asset Div_asset  
       









Notes: In this table, we report the results of a DID estimator based on PSM with nearest neighbor, where the 
dependent variable is dividends to total assets ratio (Div_asset). Definitions of Ln_asset, NI and Capital are described 
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